The impact of personal attributes on corporate insider trading by Hillier, David et al.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Hillier, David and Korczak, Adriana and Korczak, Piotr (2015) The impact 
of personal attributes on corporate insider trading. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 30. pp. 150-167. ISSN 0929-1199 , 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.12.003
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/50893/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
  	

The Impact of Personal Attributes on Corporate Insider Trading
David Hillier, Adriana Korczak, Piotr Korczak
PII: S0929-1199(14)00155-2
DOI: doi: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.12.003
Reference: CORFIN 867
To appear in: Journal of Corporate Finance
Received date: 5 March 2014
Revised date: 10 December 2014
Accepted date: 11 December 2014
Please cite this article as: Hillier, David, Korczak, Adriana, Korczak, Piotr, The Impact
of Personal Attributes on Corporate Insider Trading, Journal of Corporate Finance (2014),
doi: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.12.003
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could aﬀect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
The Impact of Personal Attributes on Corporate Insider Trading 
 
David Hillier*, Adriana Korczak and Piotr KorczakÁ 
 
 
This version: December 2014 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze the importance of personal attributes in explaining the performance of reported share 
transactions by corporate insiders. While prior literature has focused on observable firm and trade 
characteristics, little effort has been made to understand how individual attributes, such as skills, 
abilities, or personality, impact upon post-trade abnormal returns. We document that personal 
attributes explain up to a third of the variability in insider trading performance and dominate 
unobservable and observable firm and trade characteristics by a sizeable margin. Personal attributes 
are correlated with WKH LQVLGHU¶Vyear of birth, education and gender, and matter more in companies 
with greater information asymmetry and when outsiders are inattentive to public information. We 
shed also new light on the significance of executive hierarchy and regulations in explaining insider 
trading performance and highlight the importance of controlling for individual fixed effects in insider 
trading research to avoid omitted variable bias in estimated regression coefficients. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Do corporate insider attributes have an impact on insider trading performance? Given that trading 
decisions are individually made by insiders, it is surprising we still know little about the extent to 
which LQVLGHUV¶ personal characteristics affect returns following their trades. Earlier studies focus 
predominantly on firm-level characteristics and it is now widely accepted that insider trading patterns 
and performance differ with the ILUP¶VVL]Hand book-to-market ratio (e.g. Seyhun, 1986; Rozeff and 
Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005). Extant literature also documents that insider 
trading profitability depends upon firm-level characteristics such as analyst coverage (Frankel and Li, 
2004), ownership structure (Fidrmuc et al., 2006), antitakeover provisions (Ravina and Sapienza, 
2010), the role of general counsel (Jagolinzer et al., 2011), the quality of internal control (Skaife et al., 
2013), anti-shareholder mechanisms (Cziraki et al., 2013), advertising expenditures (Joseph and 
Wintoki, 2013), and concentrated sales relationships (Alldredge and Cicero, 2013). Unfortunately, the 
power of the proposed explanatory variables in capturing insider trading return variability is rather 
poor.1 
 
We argue that insider trading decisions and their performance are to a large extent driven by insiders¶ 
individual skills and abilities to acquire and process private and public information. This includes any 
biases such as overconfidence, optimism or limited attention, as well as attitudes to risk and 
willingness to trade on private information. Personal characteristics have two main features. First, 
behavioral economics, psychology and the genetics literature suggest that personality traits are fixed 
or slow-moving over time. Second, they are unobservable to the econometrician. Consequently, we 
propose to capture individual heterogeneity using insider fixed effects. In a set of tests we ascertain 
the extent to which variation in abnormal returns following insider trades is explained by individual 
fixed effects after controlling for known firm and transaction-level determinants of trading 
profitability. The approach builds on earlier studies in which individual fixed effects are used to 
identify managerial styles in a variety of contexts (e.g. Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Coles and Li, 
2011a, 2011b; Graham et al., 2012). 
 
We show that individual managerial traits are significant determinants of insider trading performance. 
Factors that are usually considered in the insider trading literature (firm size, book-to-market ratio, 
transaction size) explain only a very small proportion of the variation in insider trading performance, 
                                                        
1
 Although observable firm and transaction-level variables are statistically and economically significant, they 
explain only a small fraction of the variability of insider trading returns. For example, the adjusted R-square in 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) is less than 5 percent. Cross-sectional regressions without firm fixed effects presented in 
Ravina and Sapienza (2010) have an R-square statistic of less than 1 percent. 
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and adding insider fixed effects to the regressions substantially improves their explanatory power. 
Depending on the return horizon and transaction type (purchases or sales), insider fixed effects 
increase the adjusted R-square from less than 3 percent to between 19 and 39 percent, several 
percentage points more than firm fixed effects alone.  
 
Since firms and insiders do not match randomly, their effects are likely to be correlated. To make sure 
that insider effects do not pick up firm-level fixed effects, we draw on the method proposed by 
Abowd et al. (1999), which allows for simultaneous identification of both insider and firm fixed 
effects. We find that insider fixed effects explain up to a third of the variability of post-trade abnormal 
returns and have up to three times more explanatory power than firm fixed effects. The effect of 
individual heterogeneity is also economically very large. The interquartile range of the estimated 
insider fixed effects is between 15 and 51 percentage points, depending on the model. 
 
The fixed-effect approach sheds light on how much of the variability in insider trading performance is 
explained by individual characteristics but not on what those characteristics are. To address that point 
we test the link between estimated individual fixed effects and education, birth cohort and gender. 
Previous literature argues that those observed characteristics are related to or impact on skills, abilities, 
conservatism, risk aversion, overconfidence or attitude to social norms and hence overall lead to 
person-specific styles in financial decision making (Falato et al., 2014; Schoar and Zuo, 2011; 
Malmendier et al., 2011; Faccio et al., 2014). We show that individual fixed effects in our regression 
setup are related to the year in which the insider was born, with better trading performance by 
younger generations of insiders. We also find some evidence that insider trading performance is 
related to WKHLQVLGHU¶VJHQGHUDQGHGXFDWLRQ 
 
In further tests we assess the nature of information on which individual insiders trade. We find that 
personal traits matter for trading on both public and private information as insider fixed effects 
explain a larger proportion of the post-trade return variability in firms with economically-linked 
customers (a proxy for a richer public information environment (Alldredge and Cicero (2013)) and in 
firms without analyst coverage (a proxy for information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders 
(Frankel and Li, 2004; Ellul and Panayides, 2012)). We also find that after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
was introduced in 2002, the role of differences across individuals in explaining insider buying 
performance increased, while the role of firm heterogeneity sharply declined.  The results do not 
apply to insider sales, which are normally regarded as being driven by non-information factors. 
Individual trading behaviors thus seem to be deeply rooted in personalities, and do not appear to be 
affected by broad-brush regulation. Controlling for individual fixed effects also allows us to 
GLVHQWDQJOH ZKHWKHU DEQRUPDO UHWXUQV DUH UHODWHG WR WKH H[HFXWLYH¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ the firm or to the 
personal traits of the individual. It appears that, in general, the underperformance of CEOs is driven 
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by a higher scrutiny associated with the position, while CFO outperformance is determined by 
individual attributes such as, for example, superior financial acumen. 
 
The documented importance of individual effects rules out alternative views on what may determine 
insider trading performance. One such alternative view is that insider-specific characteristics play 
only a minor role in explaining variability in trading performance since individual behaviors are 
constrained by the effective public and private enforcement of insider trading regulations (Agrawal 
and Nasser, 2012; Cohen et al., 2012). Yet another alternative is that firm-level voluntary insider 
trading restrictions have an important role in shaping individual insider trading choices within a firm 
(Bettis et al., 2000; Lee et al., 2014). If firm-level insider trading rules are endogenously linked to the 
risk culture within a firm, then cross-sectional differences in insider trading performance can be 
captured by firm-specific fixed effects. We find that although firm-level effects are statistically 
important, they are dominated by person-specific effects.  
 
The importance of individual heterogeneity for insider trading performance can be explained in a 
number of ways. One interpretation is that trading performance is closely aligned to the abilities and 
character of individual insiders, irrespective of corporate governance. Formal structures that enhance 
the independence of boards or improve reporting transparency or disclosure do little to constrain the 
opportunistic behavior of individuals who choose to exploit any misvaluation in WKHFRPSDQ\¶Vstock 
price. Alternatively, and consistent with a signaling hypothesis, it may also be the case that corporate 
insiders with certain characteristics choose to personally signal that their firm¶V stock price is 
abnormally high or low. The market thus responds proportionately to the degree to which the insider 
is respected in the market. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. It adds to the insider trading literature by 
documenting the significance of personal traits in explaining insider trading performance. The paper 
also shows the impact of executive hierarchy on insider trading performance given mixed earlier 
evidence (e.g. Seyhun, 1986; Jeng et al., 2003; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010) and 
highlights the importance of controlling for insider fixed effects to avoid potential omitted-variable 
bias in estimated regression coefficients. 
 
On a more general note, we build on and contribute to the literature on the investment performance of 
individuals and on the importance of innate characteristics in financial decision making. For example, 
Barnea et al. (2010) and Cesarini et al. (2010) find that genetic variation has explanatory power for 
stock market participation, asset allocation and individual portfolio risk. Barber and Odean (2001) 
report different rates of portfolio turnover and performance in men and women and attribute this to 
gender-specific levels of overconfidence. Similarly, Bharath et al. (2009) and Gregory et al. (2013) 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
4 
 
document different abnormal returns following trades by male and female insiders, and Jia at al. (2014) 
show a link between a measure of CEO masculinity and the extent of opportunistic insider trading. 
Grinblatt et al. (2012) find that stock trading decisions and performance are related to IQ score. 
Davidson et al. (2013) show that executives who reveal lower respect for rules and higher materialism 
are more likely to trade on profitable information, and, in a similar vein, Bhattacharya and Marshall 
(2012) argue that the decision to trade on inside information may be explained by unobservable 
psychological factors, such as hubris. Alldredge and Cicero (2013) provide evidence that insider 
WUDGLQJ SHUIRUPDQFH LV GULYHQ E\ LQVLGHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR SD\ DWWHQWLRQ WR DQG FRUUHFWO\ LQWHUSUHW SXEOLF
information about their customers. The documented importance of fixed person-specific effects for 
the performance of insider trades corroborates also the findings by Cohen et al. (2012) who split 
insiders into routine and opportunistic traders based on the pattern of initial trades and using that fixed 
classification over time show that opportunistic traders persistently outperform routine traders. 
 
Finally, the paper has implications for the literature on managerial styles. Bertrand and Schoar (2003), 
Coles and Li (2011a, 2011b), Graham et al. (2012) and others show that there is an important 
XQREVHUYHGPDQDJHULDOVW\OHFRPSRQHQWLQDQXPEHURIFRUSRUDWHILQDQFHFKRLFHVVSDQQLQJWKHILUP¶V
investment, capital structure, payout and compensation policies.2 Similarly, Bamber et al. (2010), 
Dyreng et al. (2010) and Ge et al. (2011) show the impact of executive-VSHFLILF HIIHFWV RQ ILUPV¶
accounting choices, including voluntary disclosure and tax avoidance. Moreover, it is documented 
that executives reveal consistent styles across firm and individual choices (e.g. Lee et al., 1992; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Cronqvist et al., 2012; Kolasinski and Li, 2013; Bonaime and Ryngaert, 
2013). This paper documents the impact of managerial styles on individual decisions related to own 
ILUP¶VVHFXULWLHV. 
 
In the next section, we outline the empirical framework and in Section 3, we describe the data. 
Section 4 presents our empirical results and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Empirical Framework 
 
The aim of the empirical tests in this paper is to determine the extent to which personal and individual 
attributes are important in explaining post-trade buy-and-hold insider abnormal returns. Our testing 
strategy is to first identify the explanatory power of observable firm, trade and insider characteristics, 
                                                        
2
 In a recent study, Fee et al. (2013) use exogenous features of managerial turnover to provide a fuller picture of 
WKH LPSDFW RI PDQDJHULDO VW\OHVRQ ILUPV¶ LQYHVWPHQW DQG ILQDQFLDO GHFLVLRns. They reject the hypothesis that 
managerial styles are idiosyncratic and unanticipated by the board. In contrast, boards select CEOs with certain 
perceived styles that have a causal role in the selection of firm policies. 
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taken from previous literature to determine the performance of insider trading. Then, we test the 
incremental explanatory power of time-invariant unobserved personal attributes captured by insider 
fixed effects, controlling for the observable characteristics. Because unobserved insider and firm 
characteristics can be correlated, we implement a series of tests to identify and disentangle the 
explanatory power of insider and firm fixed effects. 
 
We start with separately estimating the following baseline model for sale and purchase transactions: 
BHARijt = Xijtȕİijt, (1) 
where BHARijt is the buy-and-hold abnormal return following a trade by insider i in company j on day 
t. Xijt is a vector of time-varying firm, trade and insider observable characteristics and year dummies. 
The firm-level characteristics we include are firm size, book-to-market ratio and past stock return. 
Earlier studies show that insider trading profits are larger in small firms (e.g., Seyhun, 1986, 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001), and the book-to-market ratio and past stock return control for contrarian 
trading by corporate insiders (e.g., Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Jenter, 2005). The trade-level 
characteristic is transaction size, since larger trades have arguably greater information content and are 
associated with higher abnormal returns.3 The insider-level observable characteristics are two dummy 
variables (CEO and CFO) to capture the insLGHU¶V UROH LQ WKH FRPSDQ\, their access to private 
information, and stronger regulatory scrutiny (Seyhun, 1986; Jeng et al., 2003; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; 
Ravina and Sapienza, 2010). All regressions include year dummies to control for possible time trends 
in insider trade performance. Note that the inclusion of year dummies does not add the standard time 
dimension in a panel setting since there can be more than one trade per firm and insider in a unit of 
time (year). 
 
We next add insider fixed effects, Ji, to the baseline regressions and estimate model (2) below to 
ascertain the change in adjusted R-square compared to the baseline model (1). 
BHARijt = XijtȕJi İijt (2) 
BHARijt and Xijt are defined as before. Using insider fixed effects allows us to shed light on whether 
the observed link between executive position and trading performance is driven by position per se, or 
whether it captures unobservable time-invariant insider characteristics correlated with an individual 
being in the role. Note that we are able to jointly identify the executive position dummies and insider 
fixed effects since an individual can trade in the same or another company before and after their 
current employment. The same principle applies if insiders with multiple board appointments 
concurrently trade in more than one of the firms in which they are employed.  
 
                                                        
3
 See Seyhun (1986) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) for competing perspectives on trade size metrics. 
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The change in adjusted R-square between models (1) and (2) provides direct evidence on the 
importance of unobserved, time-invariant insider characteristics in explaining post-trade abnormal 
returns. However, an important caveat is in order. Insiders and firms do not match randomly and 
individuals with specific characteristics are likely to seek employment in or to be sought by firms with 
particular profiles. In the context of our tests it means that estimated insider fixed effects can also 
capture unobserved firm characteristics. To explore this possibility we perform three tests. First, we 
re-estimate model (2) replacing insider fixed effects, Ji, with firm fixed effects, Pj: 
BHARijt = XijtȕPj İijt, (3) 
where BHARijt and Xijt are defined as before. We compare the adjusted R-square of models (3) and 
(2) to provide initial evidence on which of insider and firm fixed effects have a greater incremental 
explanatory power. Second, we estimate the baseline model (1) with fixed effects for every insider-
firm combination, Qij: 
BHARijt = XijtȕQij İijt. (4) 
The adjusted R-square of model (4) compared to models (2) and (3) indicates if jointly controlling for 
unobserved insider and firm heterogeneity increases the explanatory power of the regression. The 
drawback of the method is that it does not allow for the separation of insider and firm effects. We 
address this drawback in the third test, which aims to explain insider trading performance by 
disentangling the effects of time-invariant unobserved individual and firm effects in a µFRQQHFWHGQHVV¶
sample. 
 
The concept of µFRQQHFWHGQHVV¶ZDV originally proposed by Abowd et al. (1999) and recently applied 
in a finance context by Coles and Li (2011a, 2011b) and Graham et al. (2012).4 Insider and firm fixed 
effects can be separately estimated for all trades linked E\DVLQJOHLQVLGHU¶VWUDGLQJLQPXOWLSOHILUPV - 
that is, trading by an individual who moves between firms or who holds multiple board 
appointments.5 Specifically, insider and firm fixed effects can be separately estimated for transactions 
by all insiders who trade in firms with at least one multi-firm insider, no matter in how many firms 
they trade themselves. To illustrate, if an insider trades in firms A and B, her multi-firm transactions 
                                                        
4
 See Appendix 2 in Graham et al. (2012) for a detailed methodological and econometric discussion of the 
estimation procedure. 
5
 Abowd et al. (1999), Coles and Li (2011a, 2011b) and Graham et al. (2012) call individuals with observations 
LQ PRUH WKDQ RQH FRPSDQ\ µPRYHUV¶ DQG WKH UHODWHG VDPSOH WKH µPRELOLW\¶ VDPSOH ,Q RXU VWXG\ PRELOLW\
EHWZHHQILUPVLVQRWDQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQDVZHFDQREVHUYHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VWUDGHVLQPRUHWKDQRQH firm even 
without the executive moving jobs. This is because individuals can hold multiple appointments at the same time. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
7 
 
are a necessary and sufficient condition to identify insider and firm fixed effects for trades by all 
insiders in firms A and B.6 
 
We therefore estimate the following model: 
BHARijt = Xijtȕ + Ji + Pj + İijt, (5) 
with all notation as before. To understand the relative importance of unobserved fixed insider and 
firm characteristics in explaining the post-trade buy-and-hold returns, the R-square of the estimated 
models with insider and firm fixed effects is decomposed following the method proposed by Graham 
et al. (2012). The model R-square can be presented as 
 
 (6) 
 
The standardized covariances measure the proportion of the PRGHO¶V VXPRI VTXDUHV DWWULEXWDEOH WR
individual observable characteristics, insider fixed effects and firm fixed effects, respectively. For 
example, cov BHARijt , Ög i( )
var BHARijt( )
can be interpreted as the importance of insider fixed effects in explaining the 
variance of buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
 
We are also interested in the significance of observable characteristics, conditional on unobservable 
insider and firm characteristics. It is likely that unobservable effects are correlated with observable 
factors. For example, latent skills and abilities will be related to the probability of an individual being 
in a top executive position (such as CEO or CFO), and these characteristics are likely to influence 
insider trading performance. If unobservable insider and firm effects are correlated with observable 
characteristics, the coefficients of observable factors are estimated with bias if there is no control for 
the unobservable effects. Hence, our empirical approach allows us to reinterpret the impact of 
observable factors traditionally considered in the insider trading literature.  
 
3. Data and Variable Definitions 
 
The primary data source is Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF). The database contains 
information on reported share transactions by corporate insiders, defined as officers, directors, and 
beneficial owners of more than 10 percent of shares outstanding. The information includes the type of 
                                                        
6
 Because we analyze purchases and sales separately, the discussion only applies to same-type trades by an 
insider in more than one fLUP7KDWLVDQLQVLGHU¶VSXUFKDVHWUDQVDFWLRQLQILUP$DQGDVDOHLQILUP%GRHVQRW
allow for the estimation. 
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transaction (buy/sell), transaction date, volume, price, security identifier, and data on the insider who 
traded. The sample contains all trades executed between January 1986 and December 2010. Since our 
focus is on individual insider characteristics, we exclude trades by beneficiary owners (mainly 
financial institutions) who are not officers or directors. We further limit our sample to open market or 
private purchases and sales (IFDF codes P and S) of common stock (CRSP share codes 10 and 11). 
Any trade where the reported volume is higher than the trading volume on the transaction day 
reported in CRSP or the transaction day closing price is lower than USD 2.00 is dropped from the 
sample. We also exclude trades in firms with a negative book-to-market ratio on the trading day. 
 
Multiple transactions by a single insider on the same day in the same direction (buy or sell) are 
cumulated to give a single daily buy or sell trade. We do so for two reasons. First, same-day trades are 
likely to be executed on the basis of similar information. Second, treating multiple trades as separate 
observations could increase the correlation of post-transaction abnormal returns for a given insider 
and firm, and this would influence the statistical relationship between insider/firm fixed effects and 
abnormal returns we aim to establish. 
 
Firm-level stock market and accounting data are sourced from CRSP/Compustat. Individual insider 
characteristics (age, gender, education) come from BoardEx. BoardEx spans a number of countries 
and contains detailed biographical information on officers and directors, together with compensation 
data (see, e.g. Fernandes et al., 2013). Individuals in the Thomson Reuters IFDF and BoardEx 
databases are manually matched on surname, given name, middle name, and the names of companies 
in which they serve. BoardEx database coverage begins in the late 1990s, and even though we focus 
on time-invariant insider characteristics, information on insiders in the earlier years of our sample 
period is likely to be incomplete. 
 
Abnormal returns are estimated following Ravina and Sapienza (2010). For each transaction in our 
sample we estimate buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) over 30, 90, and 180 trading days 
following the transaction, with the CRSP value-weighted index used as a benchmark. Firm size is 
proxied by the natural logarithm of market capitalization (measured on the trade date as the number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price) and expressed in USD millions. Book-to-market 
ratio is calculated as book value of common equity at the end of most recent fiscal quarter divided by 
market capitalization on the trading day. Past stock return is defined as the buy-and-hold abnormal 
return over 90 trading days preceding the transaction date. Trade size is measured as shares traded 
divided by the number of shares outstanding. The CEO (CFO) dummy variable is equal to one if a 
trade is executed by the CEO (CFO), and zero otherwise. We rely on the IFDF database for the 
executive hierarchy (CEO/CFO) classification. 
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Information on the sample, as well as descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
is presented in Table 1. Our final sample includes over 310,000 purchases and 823,000 sales. The 
average number of transactions per insider, important from the viewpoint of estimating insider fixed 
effects, is 4.3 and 7.9 in the purchase and sale samples, respectively.7 At the firm level, there are an 
average of 28.5 purchase transactions and 76.6 sales transactions per firm. Consistent with prior 
literature, we find that the mean abnormal return for purchases is larger in absolute value than for 
sales, suggesting that sales are more likely to be for liquidity and diversification reasons and less 
driven by private information.  
 
Over the 180-day horizon, purchases are associated with average abnormal returns of 6.0%, whereas 
for sales the respective number is -0.2%. The distribution of returns is skewed and medians are below 
means for both purchases and sales, making the difference in average trading performance for 
purchases and sales difficult to interpret. Looking at the independent variables, our results again 
confirm trends observed in previous studies. Sales have higher monetary value and are executed in 
larger firms; insiders are contrarians and attempt to time the market by buying (selling) after stock 
price decreases (increases); and purchase transactions tend to be in firms with higher book-to-market 
ratios. For both purchases and sales, about 10% of trades are executed by CEOs and about 5% by 
CFOs. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1.  Preliminary Evidence on The Role of Insider Attributes 
 
In this section, we examine to what extent unobservable and fixed insider attributes explain insider 
trading performance. Table 2 presents coefficients from a variety of regression model specifications 
for both purchase (Panel A) and sale (Panel B) abnormal returns. We initially include only observable 
firm, trade and insider characteristics that are normally used in the empirical insider trading literature, 
together with year dummies. Then we measure the change in regression explanatory power when 
insider and firm fixed effects capture unobserved insider and firm heterogeneity, respectively. 
 
Similar to earlier insider trading research (e.g. Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010), our 
pooled-sample test results for both purchase and sale transactions reveal very low explanatory power 
when firm and individual fixed effects are omitted. The adjusted R-square is, depending on the return 
                                                        
7
 Not to distort the picture of individual heterogeneity we preserve the number of insiders in our sample and do 
not impose restrictions of the minimum number of transactions per insider. In Section 4.6 we outline how this 
approach can influence our results and provide a robustness check for restricted samples based on the minimum 
number of trades required. 
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horizon, no bigger than 3.3% for purchases (Table 2, Panel A, columns (1)-(3)) and 1.9% for sales 
(Table 2, Panel B, columns (1)-(3)). When we add only insider fixed effects to control for the 
unobserved individual insider characteristics the R-square substantially increases. The R-square for 
models that account for insider effects is between 25.3% and 39.1% for purchases (Table 2, Panel A, 
columns (4)-(6)), and between 19.1% and 34.2% for sales (Table 2, Panel B, columns (4)-(6)), 
depending on the return horizon. The results point to the very important role of latent insider 
characteristics in explaining abnormal trading performance. 
 
When only firm fixed effects capture unobserved time-invariant firm attributes and characteristics, 
regression explanatory power is higher than in the baseline pooled specification. However, the 
increase is less than when insider fixed effects are used. The adjusted R-square of regressions with 
firm fixed effects alone is a few percentage points lower than for regressions with only insider fixed 
effects. For example, for BHAR(0,180) following purchase transactions, the adjusted R-square for the 
firm fixed effects regression is 32.8% compared to 39.1% for the insider fixed effects regression 
(Table 2, Panel A, columns (9) vs. (6)). However, both insider-level and firm-level fixed effects have 
incremental explanatory power as documented by results of regressions with insider-firm fixed effects, 
which are reported in columns (10)-(12) of Table 2, Panels A and B. Controlling for all insider-firm 
combinations shows a further increase in the adjusted R-square up to 49.5% in the longest return 
window of 180 days for purchases (Table 2, Panel A, column (12)) and up to 43.2% in the longest 
return window of 180 days for sales (Table 2, Panel B, column (12)). 
 
Results reported in Table 2 allow us to better understand the potential bias in coefficients of 
observable characteristics when firm and insider fixed effects are not controlled for. The bias arises if 
the unobservable time-invariant firm and insider characteristics are correlated with observable factors. 
If the coefficients are biased, our empirical approach can help us re-interpret results presented in the 
earlier literature. 
 
We focus on the significance and interpretation of CEO and CFO dummy variables, and we do so for 
two main reasons. First, CEO and CFO dummies are most likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. 
This is because latent skills, knowledge and personal characteristics are linked to top positions in the 
corporation, leading to correlation between unobserved insider heterogeneity, trading performance 
and executive position. Second, the literature investigating the role of position in the performance of 
insider trading presents mixed results and competing explanations. Our tests, which explicitly control 
for unobservable insider characteristics, can shed more light on what drives the trading performance 
of different insider groups. 
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Seyhun (1986) and Ravina and Sapienza (2010) find that top executives outperform other groups of 
insiders in share trading, most likely due to their privileged position with respect to the corporate 
information set. Nevertheless, this information hierarchy hypothesis is not supported by Jeng et al. 
(2003), who fail to find any abnormal trading performance by top executives. They provide a 
competing explanation based on regulatory and adverse attention risks, and claim that top executives 
(especially CEOs), who are much more closely scrutinized by regulators and investors, avoid trading 
on valuable private information. In line with the risk arguments, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) document that 
purchase transactions by CEOs generate significantly lower abnormal returns than trades of any other 
insider group. More recently, Wang et al. (2012) find that share purchases by CFOs significantly 
outperform those by CEOs. They argue that any difference in performance can be explained E\&)2V¶
better insight into the financial standing of the firm and by lower regulatory scrutiny compared to 
CEOs. Knewtson and Nofsinger (2012) explore the two competing explanations and conclude that the 
regulatory scrutiny hypothesis appears to be most appropriate. 
 
We compare the estimated coefficients of the CEO and CFO dummies in pooled OLS models without 
fixed effects and in models that control for insider fixed effects (columns (1)-(3) vs. columns (4)-(6) 
of Table 2, Panel A for purchases and Panel B for sales). Without individual fixed effects, the insider 
position dummies capture access to information and exposure to higher scrutiny on the one hand, and 
superior skills, and expertise, on the other. Inclusion of fixed effects captures the role of unobservable 
time-invariant skills and expertise, and leaves the position dummy to capture access to preferential 
information and regulatory scrutiny risk. 
 
There is a remarkable change in the significance of the CEO and CFO dummy coefficients across 
model specifications. For purchases reported in Table 2, Panel A, the coefficient of the CEO dummy 
is positive but insignificant in the pooled-sample tests and this becomes significantly negative when 
we control for unobservable insider characteristics. The change indicates that executive seniority 
leads to less information-based trading and is not related to personal characteristics (e.g. risk aversion). 
The results are supportive of the regulatory scrutiny hypothesis (Jeng et al., 2003; Fidrmuc et al., 
2006) and also indicate that the superior performance of top executives found in earlier studies may 
be driven by their unobserved personal traits. 
 
When fixed effects are not included, the coefficient of the CFO dummy in our tests for purchases is 
positive and highly significant, in line with findings by Wang et al. (2011). The coefficient becomes 
insignificant when we account for unobserved insider heterogeneities. The result indicates that 
superior trading performance is not driven by executive position and associated access to financial 
information, but rather personal characteristics such as skills and expertise. We complement 
Knewtson and Nofsinger (2012) by providing direct evidence that the weaker performance of CEO 
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insider trading is caused E\ KLJKHU VFUXWLQ\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH SRVLWLRQ ZKLOH &)2V¶ abnormal 
trading performance is determined by their superior financial acumen. 
 
For sale transactions reported in Table 2, Panel B, CFO trading performance does not differ 
significantly from the performance of other insiders, irrespective of our approach to controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneities. However, the results for CEOs are sensitive to the inclusion of fixed 
effects. For the horizon of 30 and 90 days, CEOs significantly outperform other insiders in pooled 
regressions where we find significantly lower (i.e. more negative) post-trade returns. However, the 
VXSHULRUSHUIRUPDQFHLVGULYHQE\&(2V¶XQREVHUYDEOHVNLOOVDQGDELOLWLHVWRSURFHVVLQIRUPDWLRQDQG
not their superior access to information associated with the position. Once insider fixed effects are 
included, the coefficients of the CEO dummy become positive but insignificant. As for purchases, the 
finding suggests that CEOs respond to higher scrutiny risks by avoiding informed trading.  
 
The changing signs, magnitudes and significance of the executive position dummies, together with 
changing coefficients of other observable characteristics (e.g. the effect of firm size and book-to-
market ratio in regressions for sale transactions reported in Table 2, Panel B) highlight the potential 
omitted-variable problem in empirical tests when there are no controls for unobserved heterogeneity 
at the individual or firm level. 
 
4.2. Separation of Individual and Firm Effects 
 
The results discussed so far suggest that individual heterogeneity is more important than firm 
heterogeneity in explaining insider trading performance. However, far-reaching conclusions cannot be 
drawn at this stage since it is possible that both dimensions of fixed effects are overlapping. For 
example, individual fixed effects may reflect firm-level insider trading constraints, or firm effects 
could capture average insider characteristics within a firm. We now refine our analysis to separately 
identify insider and firm effects by decomposing their relative importance in cross-sectional abnormal 
return regressions. 
 
As discussed in Section 2, the connectedness created by insiders who trade in multiple firms is a 
necessary condition to separately estimate insider and firm fixed effects. Table 3 presents information 
on the number of multi-firm insiders and the connectedness they create. Altogether, 14.6% of insiders 
in the purchase sample and 11.2% of insiders in the sell sample have trades in more than one firm, 
with the majority trading in two different firms. As can be seen from Table 3, the relatively small 
number of multiple-firm insiders still creates large connectedness among insiders. The connectedness 
sample includes around 85% of all insiders for both purchases and sales, and they execute 86.6% of 
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all purchases and as many as 90.3% of all sale transactions. The percentage of all firms included in 
the connectedness sample is smaller, standing at 71.3% for purchases and 67.1% for sales. 
 
Regression results for the connectedness sample are reported in Table 4, Panel A, and the relative 
importance of different factors is presented in Panel B of Table 4. As mentioned above, the 
connectedness requirement reduces the sample size, and the adjusted R-square in the connectedness 
sample is slightly lower compared to the R-square for insider-firm fixed effect regressions. We find 
that unobserved time-invariant insider attributes are up to 3 times more important in determining post-
trade abnormal returns than unobserved firm characteristics. The only exception is BHAR(0,180) 
following sales where insider fixed effects are dominated by firm fixed effects. Overall, insider fixed 
effects explain about 32% of the variation of abnormal returns following purchase transactions and 
about 20% of return variation after sale trades. Scaling the contributions by total variability explained 
E\ DOO FRPSRQHQWV LH WKH PRGHO¶V XQDGMXVWHG 5-square), we find that unobserved insider fixed 
characteristics contribute XSWRRIWKHPRGHO¶V5-square. 
 
There are inherent differences between insider purchases and sales (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; 
Jeng et al., 2003). While it is recognized that insiders buy shares in their own firms based on 
undervaluation and favorable information about prospects, sales can be either based on information or 
pure liquidity and diversification reasons. This is especially the case when sales are associated with 
the exercise of executive options. Additionally, trading on information is linked to asymmetric 
litigation risk (Cheng and Lo, 2006). Insiders are more likely to face litigation when they sell on 
private information rather than when they buy. This is because outside investors suffer real losses 
when they buy from insiders ahead of negative developments, and only opportunity losses when they 
sell to informed buyers. 
 
The varying nature of purchases and sales can have a complex impact on the role of individual 
heterogeneity in insider trading performance. On the one hand, more liquidity selling activity can lead 
to a lower importance of insider fixed effects in explaining post-trade abnormal returns, as liquidity 
trades are likely to be done at random times and hence not predictive for future stock returns. On the 
other hand, higher legal and regulatory risks associated with insider selling can lead to less frequent 
but more profitable trading by those who take the risk of trading on private information (see Bris, 
2005). As a result, there is greater heterogeneity in individual behaviors which is likely to lead to a 
more important role of insider attributes. Our results of the greater significance of insider fixed effects 
in explaining post-trade return variability for purchases than for sales is in line with the explanation 
based on liquidity trading. This conjecture is also supported by the lower overall adjusted R-square 
for sale transactions and a larger number of sale trades compared to purchases. 
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We restrict our discussion and inferences to an analysis of the variation in post-trade abnormal returns 
explained by fixed effects and do not formally test the joint significance of estimated fixed effects. As 
documented by Fee et al. (2013), the traditional F-test is highly problematic in settings like ours and 
there is no information content in the test in many cases. 
 
Overall, our results indicate that a large fraction of post-trade return variability is explained by 
LQVLGHUV¶XQREVHUYDEOHtraits that are not captured by observable characteristics commonly considered 
in insider trading research. Insider trading abnormal returns vary between individuals irrespective of 
the culture or corporate governance of the firm. It is possible that corporate insiders with certain 
characteristics choose to signal their views on share mispricing. In light of the importance of 
individual characteristics, it can be argued that formal regulatory initiatives to enhance firm-level 
corporate governance or transparency will have little impact on the behavior of individuals who 
choose to trade on private information. 
 
4.3. Magnitude of Individual Effects 
 
The evidence presented so far reveals that unobserved insider characteristics explain a large fraction 
of post-trade abnormal return variability. In this section we aim to understand the economic 
significance of unobserved insider characteristics by analyzing the distribution of insider fixed effects 
estimated from the connectedness sample. Since the mean and location of fixed effects depend on the 
benchmark relative to which they are estimated and are not meaningful in isolation, we focus instead 
on the dispersion of estimated fixed effects.  A large dispersion indicates substantial variability in the 
person-specific component of trading performance. For clearer presentation, we normalize the insider 
fixed effects so that their mean is zero. 
 
Following Abowd et al. (1999), the estimation method divides the connectedness sample into distinct 
groupings where firms within each group are connected by insiders trading in multiple firms, with no 
connection across groups. Firm and insider fixed effects are estimated within each group and are 
directly comparable within groups and not between groups. We present estimated insider fixed effects 
in only one, the largest group, which includes the vast majority of corporate insiders. In this group, 
there are 57,878 insiders with purchases and 85,605 insiders with sales, which is 96.4% and 96.2% of 
the total connectedness sample, respectively. 
 
Descriptive statistics of the estimated fixed effects are presented in Table 5, where there is substantial 
variation in their magnitude. The 30-day investment horizon interquartile range is 18.8% for 
purchases and 14.8% for sales, widening to 51.1% for purchases and 43.1% for sales in the longest, 
180-day, return window. The interquartile range provides an estimate of the difference in insider 
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trading performance at the 25th and 75th distribution percentiles after controlling for the impact of 
unobserved firm characteristics, executive position and observable firm and trade characteristics. This 
strongly supports the argument that unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics have a 
significant impact on insider trading performance. 
 
The next test ascertains whether estimated insider fixed effects are related to time-invariant 
observable personal characteristics. Previous research has shown that financial decision making styles 
are related to education (Falato et al., 2014), birth cohort (Schoar and Zuo, 2011; Malmendier et al., 
2011) and gender (Faccio et al., 2014). It is argued that those characteristics are linked to or impact on 
skills, abilities, conservatism, risk aversion, overconfidence or attitude to social norms that lead to 
specific financial decisions. To the best of our knowledge, out of those three characteristics, only 
gender has been analyzed in the insider trading context, and with mixed results. Bharath et al. (2009) 
report that trades by male insiders are more profitable than those by female insiders and attribute the 
difference to a disadvantaged position of female executives in accessing private information. Gregory 
et al. (2013) find that the market underreacts to transactions by female insiders in the short run but 
longer-run abnormal returns generated by women exceed those generated by male insiders. They 
argue that there is no evidence of less information conveyed by transactions by female insiders and 
the initial underreaction may be due to gender stereotypes. In a related paper, Jia at al. (2014) find that 
male CEOs with a higher index of facial masculinity are more likely to engage in opportunistic insider 
trading. 
 
We run a set of regressions with estimated insider fixed effects as the dependent variable, and three 
independent variables sourced from the BoardEx database: number of qualifications (as a proxy for 
education), year of birth and a gender dummy. The biographical data is available for about 32% 
(22%) of insiders with purchase (sale) trades. From Table 6, younger generations of insiders 
outperform older generations. Insiders born a decade (10 years) later outperform older insiders by 1.2 
percentage points over the 180-day window when they buy and by 0.5 percentage points when they 
sell shares.8 There is also weak evidence that female insiders underperform male insiders, consistent 
with the results in Bharath et al. (2009) and Jia at al. (2014), and that better educated insiders 
outperform other insiders when selling. Overall, the regression R-squares are very low indicating that 
time-invariant personal characteristics we analyze explain only a very small fraction of the variability 
of individual effects in insider trading performance. 
 
 
                                                        
8
 Note that the significance of the year of birth does not reflect any time trends in insider trading performance as 
they are controlled for with year dummies in all baseline regressions. 
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4.4. Trading on Private vs. Public Information 
 
We next investigate whether individual insider attributes lead to trading on public and/or private 
information. Insiders profit from superior information and trade as contrarians (Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2005). A traditional and very intuitive view is that despite security laws prohibiting trading 
on private information, insiders can still benefit from their advantageous position inside the firm 
(Jaffe, 1974). Recent evidence also suggests that insiders exploit inattentive outsiders and successfully 
profit from trading on relevant public information (Alldredge and Cicero, 2013). 
 
We test whether individual fixed effects explain different portions of variability in trading 
performance across firm subsamples with different levels of public and private information. If insiders 
differ in their ability to collect and process public information, we should see a greater impact of 
insider fixed effects on insider trading performance in companies with a rich public information 
environment. Similarly, if insider traits are manifested in different abilities to process and trade on 
private information, insider fixed effects should matter more in companies with large information 
asymmetries where insiders have an information advantage over outsiders. 
 
Drawing on Cohen and Frazzini (2008), we divide firms according to characteristics of the public 
information environment. A firm¶s future cash flows, and hence valuation, depend on its operations 
within the buyer-supplier networkDQGWKHILUP¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLVOLQNHG to the financial standing of its 
customers and suppliers. If key customer or supplier identities are public information and information 
about their financial situation is also SXEOLFRQHFDQSRWHQWLDOO\LQIHUDERXWWKHILUP¶VSURVSHFWVEDVHG
on public information about its trading partners. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) show that because of 
LQYHVWRUV¶DWWHQWLRQFRQVWUDLQWVVWRFNSULFHVGRQRWSURPSWO\UHIOHFWpublically available information 
about a ILUP¶V principal customers. As a result, exploiting public information about stock prices and 
the financial performance of a ILUP¶Veconomically-linked customers yields positive abnormal returns. 
Alldredge and Cicero (2013) show that insider trading is also more profitable in firms with 
economically-linked public customers. They argue that insiders are the most attentive group of 
investors, have innate abilities to collect and process public information and take advantage of the 
market inefficiency found by Cohen and Frazzini (2008). 
 
We obtain information on customer-VXSSOLHUV OLQNV IURP $QGUHD )UD]]LQL¶V ZHEVLWH9 The data set 
contains identifiers of all public firms and their principal customers that are covered by 
CRSP/Compustat. A principal customer accounts for at least 10 percent of DILUP¶Vannual sales and 
firms are obliged to report their links with principal customers following Regulation SFAS No. 131. 
                                                        
9
 http://www.econ.yale.edu/~af227/data_library.htm 
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With this information we are able to identify firms in our insider trading sample that have 
economically-linked public customers. Similar to Alldredge and Cicero (2013), for each year, we 
classify firms with principal public customers as linked suppliers, and as non-linked suppliers 
otherwise. We then re-run our main tests for insider trades in linked and non-linked suppliers to 
identify the explanatory power of insider fixed effects. The customer-supplier data covers the period 
1980-2004 so for this test we drop post-2004 insider transactions. 
 
7RGLYLGH ILUPV DFFRUGLQJ WR LQIRUPDWLRQDV\PPHWULHV DQG LQVLGHUV¶SULYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQDGYDQWDJH
we use the number of security analysts as a proxy for the number of informed traders (see Brennan et 
al., 1993). Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) theoretically show that informed traders aggressively 
compete with each other, reducing the information advantage of any single trader and causing share 
prices to rapidly reflect private information. Informed outside traders compete for information with 
insiders (e.g. Fishman and Hagerty, 1992) and in the absence of informed outsiders (analysts), 
insiders have a monopoly over information. Consistent with this argument, Frankel and Li (2004) 
report lower insider trading performance in firms with a larger analyst following, and Ellul and 
Panayides (2012) document that termination of analyst coverage reduces firm liquidity and price 
efficiency while increasing the profitability of insider trades. 
 
We source analyst coverage data from I/B/E/S. For all firms in our insider trading sample we collect 
information on the number of earnings estimates one month prior to the end of the fiscal year. If for 
the given year a company has no information on earnings estimates we set the number of analysts to 
zero. We then divide the full insider trading sample into two subsamples representing insider trades in 
firms with and without analyst earnings estimates.  
 
Table 7 presents information on the relative importance of observable characteristics, insider fixed 
effects and firm fixed effects in explaining post-trade abnormal returns.  The results are classified 
according to the public information environment (linked vs. non-linked suppliers, columns (1)-(4)) 
and the private information advantage (firms without vs. firms with analyst coverage, columns (5)-
(8)). For brevity, the estimated regression coefficients are not tabulated, but available from the authors 
upon requests. 
 
Considering different levels of public information, across all model specifications insider fixed effects 
explain a larger proportion of trading performance in firms with economically-linked customers (more 
public information). For example, for the (0,30) purchase window (Panel A, columns (1) and (2)), 
insider fixed effects explain 45.5% of the variation of post-trade abnormal returns in linked suppliers 
and only 31.0% of the return variation in non-linked suppliers. The results indicate that insider 
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attributes matter more when trading performance depends upon the appropriate use of public 
information, and one of those attributes may be the degree of attentiveness. 
 
The difference in the importance of insider fixed effects is generally more pronounced for purchase 
than for sale transactions. These findings extend the evidence in Alldredge and Cicero (2013) who 
document a difference in average insider selling but not buying performance across linked and non-
linked suppliers. They interpret their finding by arguing that insider sales are less driven by private 
information due to asymmetric litigation risks (Cheng and Lo, 2006) and hence opportunities to 
profitably trade on public information matter. On the other hand, insiders are more likely to use 
private information when buying and hence public information is incrementally less useful. We 
document that individual traits matter in paying appropriate attention to on average less valuable 
information which nevertheless creates opportunities for profits when it is correctly used. In other 
words, personal attributes matter in selective use of information when it is relatively less important, 
which leads to larger person-specific heterogeneity in performance. Attributes matter less when, on 
average, the valuable public information is abundant, as argued by Alldredge and Cicero (2013). 
 
Columns (5)-(8) of Table 7 present results for ILUPV GLYLGHG DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH LQVLGHUV¶ SULYDWH
information advantage. They show that insider attributes matter more for insider trading performance 
in firms without analyst coverage, that is in firms in which insiders have monopolistic possession of 
private information (Ellul and Panayides, 2012). The difference in the relative importance of insider 
fixed effects is as high as 9.3 percentage points (28.5% vs. 19.2%) for BHAR(0,90) following sale 
transactions (Panel B, columns (7) vs. (8)). The findings suggest that insiders systematically differ in 
the way they collect and analyze private information and are willing to trade on it given regulatory 
and reputational risks. In contrast to trading on public information, differences in the relative 
importance of insider fixed effects in explaining post-trade abnormal returns are greater for sales than 
for purchase transactions. Given the higher litigation risk when selling on private information (Cheng 
and Lo, 2006), our results indicate that there is a significant heterogeneity in the attitude to that risk 
across corporate insiders. Building on the argument in Alldredge and Cicero (2013), again we find 
that insiders differ less in trading on private information when the use of private information is likely 
to be more widespread, as in the case of purchases, but there is larger heterogeneity when the 
profitable opportunities are, on average, more limited, for example by regulatory risks, as in the case 
of sales. 
 
Taken together, we find that insider traits matter for trading on both public and private information. 
The results indicate that individual insiders systematically differ in their ability to profit from public 
information and their willingness to trade on private information. The asymmetric results between 
purchases and sales suggest that the marginal importance of individual traits for trading performance 
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is greater when, on average, specific opportunities to profit from information are less abundant. In 
other words, individual characteristics matter less when, on average, many insiders are able to make 
information-driven trading profits. 
 
4.5. Regulations and Insider Trading 
 
In this section we analyze the impact of regulations on insider trading. In particular, we test whether 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) had any influence on the role of unobservable individual and firm 
characteristics in explaining insider trading returns. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a wide-
reaching federal law with the key objective to improve corporate governance and enhance disclosure 
practices. SOX mandated stronger firm-level internal control mechanisms, but also enhanced 
individual responsibilities of top executives with increased penalties for white-collar crime. Another 
aspect of SOX was the requirement of more timely disclosure of insider trade activity. Brochet (2010) 
documents that after SOX the short-term stock price reaction to insider trading was stronger, 
indicating greater information content under the new reporting regime. He also reports that, after SOX, 
insiders were less likely to trade on negative private information, in line with the increased scrutiny of 
executive behavior introduced by regulation.  
 
It is an open question how SOX might affect the relative role of insider and firm characteristics in 
explaining post-trade abnormal returns. On the one hand, enhanced scrutiny and tighter regulations in 
the post-SOX period may curb opportunistic insider behavior, which would consequently reduce the 
role of individual heterogeneity in explaining insider trading. A contrasting view would suggest that if 
SOX successfully strengthens firm-level internal control and oversight mechanisms, there would be 
greater homogeneity across firms and latent firm-level factors would have lower power in explaining 
insider returns. 
 
To analyze the impact of SOX, we re-run regressions that include both insider and firm fixed effects 
in two sub-periods: 1991-20 µSUH-62;¶ DQG - µSRVW-62;¶ ,Q  WKH 6HFXULWLHV
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act (SERPSRA) changed SEC enforcement powers 
and increased penalties for insider trading (Lee et al., 2014). Hence we include only the post-1990 
period in our analysis to limit the impact of other regulatory changes. 
 
The results are presented in Table 8. For brevity we do not report estimated coefficients and focus 
only on the role of individual factors in explaining insider trading performance. For purchase 
transactions, we record a large increase in the role of insider fixed effects accompanied by a drop in 
the importance of firm fixed effects. For example, unobserved fixed insider characteristics explain 
29.4% of the variability in BHAR(0,90) in the pre-SOX period and the explanatory power increases to 
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46.6% after SOX (Table 8, Panel B, columns (1) and (2)). For sales, the effect is much more modest 
and the contributions from insider and firm fixed effects remain fairly stable around the enactment of 
SOX.  
 
The increase in the importance of individual heterogeneity is consistent with the argument that 
personal attributes matter more when profitable trading opportunities are restricted by tougher 
regulations. It is possible that stricter rules discourage many insiders from trading on private 
information but create an opportunity of monopoly profits for the few who find a way to evade the 
law (Bris, 2005). As a result, individual heterogeneity is observed to have greater importance. The 
asymmetric effect on stock buying and selling behavior is somewhat puzzling though and may be 
driven by the confounding influence of firm-level and individual-level responses, if both firm-level 
and insider-level factors become more homogenous. 
 
Table 8 provides convincing evidence that market wide regulations - in this case, SOX - homogenize 
the corporate landscape but have a limited impact on individual behavior once firm-level factors are 
included. Our results may indicate that individual trading behaviors are deeply rooted in personalities, 
and regulations do not alter individual heterogeneities, although they could influence average 
behavior, as found by Brochet (2010).  
 
4.6. Subsample of Insiders with at Least Three Transactions 
 
All tests presented so far do not impose any restriction on the minimum number of transactions per 
insider with an aim to preserve the cross-section of individuals. If the number of trades is correlated 
with unobservable personal traits ± for example, insiders with poorer skills to analyze information can 
choose to trade less frequently, deleting insiders with a smaller number of transactions would distort 
the picture of individual heterogeneity and, consequently, bias our results. The drawbacks of our 
approach include a lower precision of estimated individual effects for insiders with few transactions, 
and the problem of overfitting if a group of one-trade insiders accounts for a large fraction of 
observations. If overfitting is a concern, then our estimates of the importance of unobserved 
individual characteristics for insider trading performance presented so far provide the upper bound 
estimate, and the estimate would fall sharply when insiders with a low number of trades are excluded. 
 
In this section we provide a check if the key findings of this study hold when we impose a 
requirement of the minimum number of trades (separately for tests for sales and purchases) per 
individual. We follow Cohen et al. (2012) who use three trades to classify insiders and set the 
minimum requirement at three trades. This requirement should address the concern of a lack of 
precision in estimating the person-specific insider trading performance, overcome the problem of 
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overfitting, and at the same time it takes into account the fact that individual insiders do not trade 
frequently, which is an inherent issue in insider trading research (e.g. Cohen et al., 2012). 
 
Compared to the full sample reported in Table 1, imposing the requirement reduces the number of 
observations by 17.8% to 254,751 for purchases and by 7.0% to 766,130 for sales.10 In the restricted 
purchase sample there are 29,042 insiders, a reduction of 59.3%, and for sales the number of 
individuals is reduced by 40.7% to 61,589. Because, on average, insiders sell shares more frequently 
than buy, the reduction in the sample size is smaller for sales than for purchases. 
 
Using that restricted sample we re-estimate model (5) to separate insider and firm fixed effects and to 
identify the relative importance of individual factors in explaining insider trading performance. 
Results reported in Table 9 show that the significance and magnitude of coefficients of observed 
characteristics remain similar to the ones estimated in the full sample and reported in Table 4. The 
importance of determinants of BHARs is presented in Panel B of the table. As predicted, we find a 
drop in the importance of insider fixed effects but they nevertheless retain the key explanatory power 
for post-trade abnormal returns. The lack of a sharp drop in the estimated importance of individual 
attributes across models shows that overfitting is not a primary concern. The drop is most pronounced 
for purchases over the shortest horizon of 30 days, where the relative importance of insider fixed 
effects is reduced from 32.0% to 21.5% (column (1) of Panel B, Table 4 vs. Table 9). It is more 
modest for the longest horizon of 180 days (a drop from 31.9% to 25.8%), and is overall smaller for 
sales where it drops by as little as 2.1 percentage points (from 20.5% to 18.4%) for the longest 
horizon (column (6) of Panel B, Table 4 vs. Table 9). Because the performance of trading is likely to 
be more precisely measured over the longer horizon, the results show that our initial estimate of the 
importance of individual heterogeneity is not largely influenced by insiders with fewer trades in the 
full sample. 
 
Overall, we acknowledge the difficulty in precisely estimating the importance of personal attributes 
for insider trading performance. However, our results clearly indicate that insider fixed effects are a 
key factor explaining post-trade abnormal returns, and that they dominate other factors considered in 
the literature before. The analysis in the restricted sample addresses important estimation concerns but 
at the same time the results have to be interpreted with some caution as the restricted sample loses the 
breadth of the cross-section of individuals. 
 
 
 
                                                        
10
 Note that the number of observations is further reduced in the estimation which imposes the requirement of 
connectedness to identify both insider and firm fixed effects. 
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4.7. Subsample of Multiple-Firm Insiders 
 
Our tests have all used the connectedness sample, which is the sample of insider trades connected by 
individuals who traded in multiple firms. The insiders included in the sample are not required to have 
trades in more than one firm as long as they trade in a firm that has at least one multiple-firm insider. 
In this section we introduce a stricter requirement and re-run the baseline tests in a sample of 
multiple-firm insiders only. 
 
The connectedness sampling methodology relies on insiders trading in more than one firm, and when 
the number of multiple-firm insiders is relatively small, the idiosyncratic component of multiple-firm 
trading may have a large impact on the estimation (Graham et al., 2012). At the same time, the sample 
of multiple-firm insiders can suffer from selectivity bias. Insiders with trades in multiple firms are 
either individuals who have changed jobs and moved between firms, or who hold multiple board 
appointments. As such, they are likely to differ from the whole population of insiders with respect to 
expertise, skills and other personal attributes. Restricting the sample to those individuals is likely to 
remove a lot of individual heterogeneity in the sample and hence diminish the importance of 
individual unobservable characteristics in explaining trading performance. Moreover, as noted by 
Graham et al. (2012), increasing the percentage of multiple-firm insiders in a sample may raise the 
role of firm effects in explaining the dependent variable, since firm fixed effects contribute to 
between-firm and not within-firm variation in the dependent variable. Consequently, firm fixed 
effects play a more significant role in explaining trading performance for multiple-firm insiders rather 
than for single-firm insiders. 
 
The results for trades by multi-firm insiders are presented in Table 10. The sample is by construction 
much smaller, with the number of observations equal to 32.5% and 23.8% of purchases and sales in 
the connectedness sample used in regressions reported in Table 4, respectively. The coefficients in 
Table 10 and their significance are similar to those in Table 4 but there are also systematic differences 
between the restricted sample and the full connectedness sample in the relative importance of BHAR 
determinants. Consistent with the prediction, we find a fall in the importance of insider fixed effects 
and an increase in the importance of firm fixed effects.  
 
The importance of insider fixed effects in explaining the variation in BHARs is reduced by about half. 
For example, fixed effects for 30-day post-buy BHARs goes down from 32.0% (Table 4, Panel B, 
column (1)) to 15.4% (Table 10, Panel B, column (1)). The associated contribution of insider fixed 
effects WRWKHPRGHO¶V5-square decreases from 68.1% to 39.0%. Overall, in the sample of multiple-
firm insiders we find that the firm effects dominate individual effects but still the importance of 
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individual heterogeneities is not negligible and greatly exceeds the importance of observed 
characteristics (firm, insider and trade). 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
We analyze the impact of unobservable time-invariant individual attributes on the performance of 
insider trades. Our results strongly suggest that individual personality traits have a sizeable impact on 
insider trading performance, which is greater than the influence of the firm environment or observable 
characteristics. The evidence points to an important influential factor that has not yet been examined 
before, namely that corporate insiders systematically vary in their stock trading decisions in ways not 
captured by observable position or firm characteristics. The differences in individual effects are 
economically large, and the role of unobservable individual factors is most prominent when outsiders 
are inattentive to public information and when information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders 
is greater. 
 
Our tests also explore the importance of executive roles in insider trading performance. We report 
evidence that the recorded superior return performance of top executives (CEOs and CFOs) can be 
attributed to their better expertise/skills and not preferential access to firm information. Once we 
control for those unobservable individual characteristics, we find that their trading behavior is actually 
hampered by higher regulatory scrutiny and adverse attention associated with the top position. Our 
research also shows that regulations (in our case, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) homogenize the corporate 
landscape, but do little to influence individual behaviors. 
 
The findings presented in this paper have important implications. First, they highlight the need to 
control for individual effects in empirical tests of insider trading performance. Unobservable insider 
characteristics explain a large fraction of the variability of post-trade abnormal returns, and a failure 
to control for them can lead to biased coefficients and incorrect inferences on the determinants of 
trading performance. Second, the significance of insider fixed effects should be considered by 
investors who wish to exploit information on insider transactions in their own trading decisions. Our 
results show that there is persistence in the trading performance of individual insiders driven by their 
distinctive skills or other personal characteristics. Importantly, this is not captured by firm effects or 
other observable characteristics. 
 
Future research can proceed in a number of directions. First, considering that insider fixed effects 
capture the stock trading ability of executives and directors, it is relevant to ask if corporate insiders 
utilize their transaction skills in firm-level stock market activities such as share repurchases or share 
issues, and whether outside investors recognize this in their market response. Second, taking into 
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account that observable time-invariant insider characteristics perform poorly in explaining the 
variability of insider fixed-effects, further work is needed to explore what drives the large dispersion 
in individual trading performance. Attention may converge on slow-moving characteristics, such as 
experience or the centrality of the insider within business and social networks. Third, the insights 
provided in this paper can EHH[WHQGHGWR WKH LPSDFWRILQVLGHUV¶DWWULEXWHVRQ WKHLU WUDGLQJSDWWHUQV
and strategies (see, Cicero and Wintoki, 2014). We leave these issues for further research. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics ± full sample 
 
The table presents descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables used in main regression tests. BHAR(0,30) 
((0,90), (0,180)) is the stock buy-and-hold abnormal return over 30 (90, 180) trading days following the transaction. The 
abnormal returns are calculated relative to the CRSP value-weighted index. Ln (mcap) is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization on the transaction day expressed in USD millions. Book-to-market ratio is book value of common equity at the 
end of most recent fiscal quarter divided by market capitalization on the trading day. Past return is the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return over 90 trading days preceding the transaction day. Trade size is shares traded divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. CEO (CFO) dummy variable takes the value of one if the trade is executed by the CEO (CFO), and zero 
otherwise. The sample includes open market purchases and sales by corporate insiders in the period 1986-2010. Same-day, 
same-direction, same-insider and same-firm trades are cumulated and treated as one observation. Data are sourced from 
Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed, CRSP and Compustat. 
 
 Purchases (N =  310,014) Sales (N =  823,707) 
 mean std dev median mean std dev median 
Dependent variables       
BHAR(0,30) 0.025 0.186 0.007 0.003 0.178 -0.004 
BHAR(0,90) 0.041 0.350 0.003 -0.002 0.324 -0.023 
BHAR(0,180) 0.060 0.554 -0.012 -0.002 0.478 -0.044 
Independent variables       
Ln (mcap) 5.295 1.795 5.065 6.654 1.844 6.540 
Book-to-market 0.817 0.793 0.643 0.413 0.374 0.329 
Past return -0.059 0.331 -0.077 0.169 0.524 0.084 
Trade size (× 100) 0.043 0.173 0.009 0.070 0.268 0.021 
CEO dummy 0.101 0.301 0.000 0.108 0.310 0.000 
CFO dummy 0.048 0.213 0.000 0.055 0.227 0.000 
 Purchases Sales     
# of insiders  71,276  103,817     
Avg # of trades per insider  4.3  7.9     
# of firms  10,873  10,757     
Avg # of trades per firm  28.5  76.6     
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Table 2. Determinants of BHARs 
 
The table presents regression results on the determinants of buy-and-hold abnormal returns following insider purchases (Panel A) and sales (Panel B). The variables are defined in Table 1. 
Constant is included but not reported. T-stats of standard errors adjusted for clustering within firms are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, 
respectively. The sample covers the period 1986-2010. 
 
Panel A. Purchases 
 Pooled (no FE) Insider FE (no firm FE) Firm FE (no insider FE) Insider-firm FE 
 BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Ln (mcap) -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.042*** -0.085*** -0.038*** -0.118*** -0.244*** -0.059*** -0.178*** -0.361*** 
 (-5.08) (-5.77) (-4.92) (-12.16) (-14.21) (-15.08) (-19.04) (-25.32) (-25.88) (-14.79) (-19.19) (-22.61) 
Book-to-market 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.053*** 0.012*** 0.001 -0.016* 0.013*** -0.004 -0.033*** 
 (5.08) (3.45) (3.29) (5.64) (4.78) (4.55) (3.52) (0.26) (-1.80) (2.61) (-0.54) (-2.66) 
Past return -0.020*** 0.020** 0.083*** -0.037*** -0.032** -0.013 -0.021*** 0.010 0.060*** -0.038*** -0.032** -0.008 
 (-5.33) (2.44) (4.99) (-9.13) (-2.34) (-0.58) (-6.13) (1.14) (3.79) (-8.69) (-2.39) (-0.34) 
Trade size 3.916*** 3.989*** 3.085*** 2.459*** 2.141*** 1.131 2.835*** 2.362*** 1.156 2.265*** 1.612** 1.045 
 (8.52) (5.37) (3.11) (4.83) (2.60) (1.11) (6.99) (3.67) (1.31) (4.34) (2.04) (1.07) 
CEO dummy 0.003 0.005 0.006 -0.010*** -0.019** -0.031** -0.003* -0.005 -0.010 -0.012** -0.022** -0.044** 
 (1.19) (0.91) (0.72) (-2.62) (-2.31) (-2.02) (-1.69) (-1.20) (-1.42) (-2.26) (-2.07) (-2.31) 
CFO dummy 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.042*** 0.002 0.005 0.023 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.022*** -0.011 -0.022 -0.013 
 (6.35) (4.24) (4.20) (0.36) (0.46) (0.00) (3.98) (3.34) (0.00) (-1.32) (-1.30) (-0.46) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-sq 1.9% 2.7% 3.3% 25.3% 32.6% 39.1% 17.0% 24.9% 32.8% 30.7% 40.3% 49.5% 
# of observations 310,014 310,014 310,014 310,014 310,014 310,014 310,014 310,014 310,014 310,014 310,014 310,014 
(continued)
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Table 2. - continued 
 
Panel B. Sales 
 Pooled (no FE) Insider FE (no firm FE) Firm FE (no insider FE) Insider-firm FE 
 BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Ln (mcap) -0.001** 0.002** 0.003* -0.026*** -0.082*** -0.160*** -0.040*** -0.129*** -0.261*** -0.059*** -0.190*** -0.377*** 
 (-2.06) (2.03) (1.84) (-21.56) (-23.78) (-23.42) (-21.79) (-26.14) (-28.48) (-23.71) (-26.36) (-26.96) 
Book-to-market -0.006*** 0.004 0.026*** -0.002 0.013 0.041*** -0.021*** -0.042*** -0.066*** -0.020*** -0.047*** -0.080*** 
 (-3.08) (0.77) (2.69) (-0.68) (1.43) (2.69) (-5.59) (-4.09) (-3.74) (-3.92) (-3.38) (-3.48) 
Past return 0.002 0.006 0.017** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.004 -0.009*** -0.006 0.017*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 0.011 
 (0.57) (1.42) (2.30) (-5.87) (-4.28) (-0.49) (-2.85) (-1.38) (2.69) (-5.58) (-3.28) (1.41) 
Trade size 1.057*** 0.867*** 0.653 0.815*** 0.602* -0.323 1.154*** 1.452*** 1.616*** 1.359*** 1.646*** 1.136* 
 (4.95) (2.73) (1.30) (3.32) (1.72) (-0.64) (5.73) (5.01) (3.87) (4.68) (3.97) (1.94) 
CEO dummy -0.004*** -0.007* -0.008 0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.002* -0.003 -0.006 0.005 0.011* 0.025** 
 (-2.64) (-1.83) (-1.21) (0.34) (0.01) (0.39) (-1.80) (-1.21) (-1.45) (1.60) (1.71) (2.33) 
CFO dummy -0.002 -0.005 -0.010 0.005 0.003 0.006 -0.001 -0.005* 0.010** 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.36) (-1.49) (-1.62) (1.39) (0.45) (0.67) (-0.78) (-1.71) (-2.20) (0.69) (-0.11) (-0.06) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-sq 0.5% 1.9% 1.8% 19.1% 27.9% 34.2% 11.8% 20.7% 28.5% 22.7% 34.3% 43.2% 
# of observations 823,707 823,707 823,707 823,707 823,707 823,707 823,707 823,707 823,707 823,707 823,707 823,707 
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Table 3. Insiders with trades in multiple firms and connectedness sample 
 
The table presents information on the number of insiders with trades in more than one firm (Panel A) and the size of the 
connectedness sample (Panel B). The connectedness sample includes trades by insiders in firms that have at least one insider 
with trades in at least one other firm. 
 
Panel A. Insiders with trades in more than one firm 
 Purchases Sales 
 N % of all N % of all 
Total  10,430  14.6%  11,612  11.2% 
Insiders with trades in two firms  7,195  10.1%  8,800  8.5% 
Insiders with trades in three firms  1,930  2.7%  1,885  1.8% 
Insiders with trades in four or more firms  1,305  1.8%  927  0.9% 
Panel B. Connectedness sample 
 Purchases Sales 
 N % of all N % of all 
Trades  268,421  86.6%  744,064  90.3% 
Insiders  60,041  84.2%  88,968  85.7% 
Firms  7,756  71.3%  7,222  67.1% 
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Table 4. Relative importance of determinants of post-trade BHARs 
 
Panel A of the table presents regression results on the determinants of buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) following 
insider transactions. The variables are defined in Table 1. Constant is included but not reported. The sample (connectedness 
sample) includes trades by insiders in firms that have at least one insider with trades in at least one other firm, and allows for 
separate identification of insider and firm fixed effects. T-stats of standard errors adjusted for clustering within firms are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. Panel B presents the 
analysis of the relative importance of individual determinants (observable characteristics, insider fixed effects and firm fixed 
effects) in explaining the variability of post-trade BHARs. The sample covers the period 1986-2010. 
 
 Purchases Sales 
 BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Regression results 
Ln (mcap) -0.053*** -0.160*** -0.327*** -0.055*** -0.179*** -0.358*** 
 (-15.87) (-20.95) (-23.21) (-23.29) (-26.04) (-27.35) 
Book-to-market 0.015*** 0.001 -0.016 -0.020*** -0.040*** -0.065*** 
 (3.02) (0.08) (-1.31) (-4.20) (-2.98) (-2.92) 
Past return -0.035*** -0.018 0.011 -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.011 
 (-7.61) (-1.63) (0.66) (-5.02) (-3.23) (1.60) 
Trade size 2.387*** 2.197** 1.144 1.381*** 1.683*** 1.205** 
 (4.12) (2.44) (1.06) (4.92) (4.20) (2.12) 
CEO dummy -0.012*** -0.013 -0.028* 0.006* 0.013** 0.026*** 
 (-2.57) (-1.45) (-1.70) (1.92) (2.21) (2.71) 
CFO dummy -0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.68) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (-0.11) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-sq 29.2% 40.0% 47.8% 20.9% 32.0% 41.6% 
# of observations 268,421 268,421 268,421 744,064 744,064 744,064 
Panel B. Relative importance of determinants of BHARs 
 cov(BHAR, determinant) 
var(BHAR) 
Observable 
characteristics 
incl. year dummies 0.049 0.071 0.088 0.014 0.024 0.035 
Insider FE 0.320 0.321 0.319 0.203 0.208 0.205 
Firm FE 0.102 0.159 0.202 0.093 0.176 0.251 
Residual 0.529 0.449 0.391 0.689 0.593 0.509 
 % of R-sq attributable to the determinant 
Observable 
characteristics 
incl. year dummies 10.4% 12.9% 14.4% 4.5% 5.9% 7.1% 
Insider FE 68.1% 58.2% 52.4% 65.4% 51.0% 41.8% 
Firm FE 21.6% 28.9% 33.2% 30.1% 43.1% 51.1% 
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Table 5. Estimated insider fixed effects 
 
The table presents descriptive statistics of insider fixed effects estimated in regressions in the connectedness sample reported 
in Table 4. To maintain comparability of fixed-effects, only fixed effects for insiders in the largest group of firms connected 
by multi-firm insider trading are presented. Fixed effects are normalized so that their mean is zero. 
 
Panel A. Purchases (N = 57,878) 
 mean std dev p25 median p75 p75-p25 
BHAR(0,30) 0.000 0.215 -0.096 -0.003 0.092 0.188 
BHAR(0,90) 0.000 0.387 -0.179 -0.006 0.167 0.346 
BHAR(0,180) 0.000 0.586 -0.265 -0.005 0.246 0.511 
Panel B. Sales (N = 85,605) 
 mean std dev p25 median p75 p75-p25 
BHAR(0,30) 0.000 0.172 -0.075 -0.001 0.073 0.148 
BHAR(0,90) 0.000 0.310 -0.147 -0.001 0.139 0.286 
BHAR(0,180) 0.000 0.439 -0.217 0.001 0.214 0.431 
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Table 6. Insider fixed effects and observable time-invariant insider characteristics 
 
The table presents the analysis of the link between estimated insider fixed effects and observable time-invariant insider 
characteristics: education, birth cohort and gender. Panel A presents descriptive statistics of the observable characteristics. 
Table B presents regression results. Dependent variables are insider fixed effects estimated in the connectedness sample 
regressions reported in Table 5. T-stats of heterskedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Constant is 
included but not reported. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 Purchases (N=18,241) Sales (N=19,189) 
 mean std dev median mean std dev median 
No of qualifications 1.75 1.21 2.00 1.76 1.19 2.00 
Year of birth 1946 1946 10.01 1947 1947 10.28 
Female dummy 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.07 0.26 0.00 
Panel B. Regression results 
 Purchases Sales 
 (0,30) (0,90) (0,180) (0,30) (0,90) (0,180) 
No of qualifications 0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0033 -0.0004 -0.0022 -0.0053** 
 (1.31) (-0.59) (-0.95) (-0.35) (-1.39) (-2.28) 
Year of birth 0.0001 0.0005* 0.0012*** -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0005* 
 (0.97) (1.94) (-0.76) (-3.68) (-3.47) (-1.85) 
Female dummy -0.0079* -0.0103 -0.0095 0.0055 0.0095 0.0059 
 (-1.69) (-1.23) (-0.76) (1.57) (1.38) (0.62) 
R-sq 0.03% 0.03% 0.05% 0.08% 0.09% 0.05% 
# of observations 18,241 18,241 18,241 19,189 19,189 19,189 
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Table 7. Public and private information and relative importance of determinants of post-trade BHARs 
 
The table presents the relative importance of individual factors in explaining the variability of post-trade buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) across subsamples. The subsample of linked (non-linked) 
suppliers includes insider transactions in firms with (without) principal customers in the given year. A principal customer is a customer that accounts for at least 10% of annual sales of the firm. The 
subsample of firms without (with) analyst coverage includes insider transactions in firms without (with) analyst earnings estimates for the given year as reported in I/B/E/S. In underlying regressions 
BHARs over 30, 90 and 180 days following insider trades are regressed on firm size, book-to-market ratio, past return, trade size, CEO and CFO dummies and year dummies. The variables are defined in 
Table 1. The regressions include insider and firm fixed effects and are estimated in the connectedness sample which includes trades by insiders in firms that have at least one insider with trades in at least 
one other firm. Regressions for supplier subsamples cover the period 1986-2004 and regressions for analyst subsamples cover the period 1986-2010. 
 
 Purchases Sales Purchases Sales 
 
Linked suppliers 
Non-linked 
suppliers Linked suppliers 
Non-linked 
suppliers 
Firms without 
analyst coverage 
Firms with 
analyst coverage 
Firms without 
analyst coverage 
Firms with 
analyst coverage 
 (N=6,546) (N=182,319) (N=34,119) (N=429,777) (N=65,340) (N=169,040) (N=103,784) (N=577,800) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A. BHAR(0,30) 
Observable characteristics 
incl. year dummies 0.081 0.059 0.079 0.017 0.042 0.074 0.026 0.018 
Insider FE 0.455 0.310 0.231 0.229 0.329 0.312 0.269 0.184 
Firm FE 0.077 0.112 0.126 0.114 0.160 0.105 0.134 0.091 
Residual 0.387 0.519 0.564 0.641 0.470 0.509 0.571 0.707 
Adjusted R-sq 36.9% 28.7% 31.6% 23.7% 35.1% 29.2% 29.5% 18.8% 
Panel B. BHAR(0,90) 
Observable characteristics 
incl. year dummies 0.105 0.098 0.144 0.025 0.065 0.104 0.033 0.035 
Insider FE 0.342 0.316 0.272 0.223 0.329 0.312 0.285 0.192 
Firm FE 0.269 0.160 0.146 0.214 0.225 0.167 0.204 0.171 
Residual 0.284 0.426 0.437 0.539 0.382 0.418 0.478 0.602 
Adjusted R-sq 53.6% 41.5% 47.0% 35.9% 47.3% 42.0% 40.9% 30.9% 
Panel B. BHAR(0,180) 
Observable characteristics 
incl. year dummies 0.104 0.123 0.199 0.038 0.083 0.131 0.026 0.059 
Insider FE 0.401 0.316 0.227 0.203 0.363 0.283 0.274 0.188 
Firm FE 0.306 0.203 0.237 0.301 0.227 0.224 0.292 0.241 
Residual 0.188 0.358 0.336 0.458 0.327 0.362 0.409 0.512 
Adjusted R-sq 69.3% 50.8% 59.2% 45.5% 54.7% 49.6% 49.5% 41.2% 
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Table 8. Regulatory changes and relative importance of determinants of post-trade BHARs 
 
The table presents the relative importance of individual factors in explaining the variability of post-trade buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. In underlying regressions BHARs over 30, 90 
and 180 days following insider trades are regressed on firm size, book-to-market ratio, past return, trade size, CEO and CFO 
dummies and year dummies. The variables are defined in Table 1. The regressions include insider and firm fixed effects and 
are estimated in the connectedness sample which includes trades by insiders in firms that have at least one insider with trades 
in at least one other firm. The pre-SOX period covers 1991-2002 and the post-SOX period covers 2003-2010. 
 
 Purchases Sales 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
 (N=143,710) (N=52,419) (N=344,429) (N=256,277) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. BHAR(0,30) 
Observable characteristics 
incl. year dummies 0.056 0.063 0.021 0.023 
Insider FE 0.313 0.411 0.229 0.173 
Firm FE 0.134 0.067 0.114 0.081 
Residual 0.496 0.458 0.636 0.724 
Adjusted R-sq 30.9% 34.7% 24.0% 16.9% 
Panel B. BHAR(0,90) 
Observable characteristics 
incl. year dummies 0.098 0.075 0.030 0.051 
Insider FE 0.294 0.466 0.201 0.190 
Firm FE 0.210 0.076 0.227 0.178 
Residual 0.398 0.383 0.541 0.581 
Adjusted R-sq 44.5% 45.4% 35.3% 33.3% 
Panel C. BHAR(0,180) 
Observable characteristics 
incl. year dummies 0.135 0.086 0.049 0.070 
Insider FE 0.289 0.433 0.188 0.205 
Firm FE 0.232 0.177 0.312 0.258 
Residual 0.344 0.305 0.451 0.467 
Adjusted R-sq 52.1% 56.6% 46.2% 46.4% 
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Table 9. Insider and firm FE regressions ± observations for insiders with at least three transactions 
 
Panel A of the table presents regression results on the determinants of buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) following 
insider transactions. The variables are defined in Table 1. Constant is included but not reported. The sample is restricted to 
insiders with at least three trades. T-stats of standard errors adjusted for clustering within firms are reported in parentheses. 
***
, 
**
, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. Panel B presents the analysis of the relative 
importance of individual determinants (observable characteristics, insider fixed effects and firm fixed effects) in explaining 
the variability of post-trade BHARs. The sample covers the period 1986-2010. 
 
 Purchases Sales 
 BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Regression results 
Ln (mcap) -0.052*** -0.156*** -0.321*** -0.055*** -0.179*** -0.358*** 
 (-16.20) (-21.19) (-23.60) (-23.49) (-26.30) (-27.67) 
Book-to-market 0.014*** 0.001 -0.015 -0.020*** -0.039*** -0.065*** 
 (3.05) (0.12) (-1.32) (-4.04) (-2.88) (-2.87) 
Past return -0.035*** -0.018 0.010 -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.012* 
 (-7.91) (-1.62) (0.64) (-4.93) (-3.21) (1.67) 
Trade size 2.272*** 2.154** 0.970 1.381*** 1.681*** 1.259** 
 (4.11) (2.50) (0.94) (4.80) (4.10) (2.19) 
CEO dummy -0.012*** -0.014 -0.026* 0.005* 0.013** 0.026*** 
 (-2.65) (-1.59) (-1.68) (1.96) (2.23) (2.73) 
CFO dummy -0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002 
 (-0.78) (-0.17) (0.02) (0.18) (0.05) (-0.16) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-sq 26.5% 38.3% 47.2% 20.6% 32.1% 41.9% 
# of observations 219,679 219,679 219,679 693,623 693,623 693,623 
Panel B. Relative importance of determinants of BHARs 
 cov(BHAR, determinant) 
var(BHAR) 
Observable 
characteristics 
incl. year dummies 0.048 0.073 0.092 0.015 0.028 0.041 
Insider FE 0.215 0.238 0.258 0.168 0.179 0.184 
Firm FE 0.110 0.162 0.199 0.093 0.174 0.245 
Residual 0.628 0.527 0.451 0.724 0.619 0.530 
 % of R-sq attributable to the determinant 
Observable 
characteristics 
incl. year dummies 12.9% 15.4% 16.8% 5.5% 7.3% 8.8% 
Insider FE 57.7% 50.3% 47.0% 60.8% 47.1% 39.2% 
Firm FE 29.4% 34.3% 36.2% 33.6% 45.6% 52.0% 
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Table 10. Insider and firm FE regressions ± observations for insiders trading in more than one firm 
 
Panel A of the table presents regression results on the determinants of buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) following 
insider transactions. The variables are defined in Table 1. Constant is included but not reported. The sample is restricted to 
insiders with trades in more than one firm. T-stats of standard errors adjusted for clustering within firms are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. Panel B presents the analysis of 
the relative importance of individual determinants (observable characteristics, insider fixed effects and firm fixed effects) in 
explaining the variability of post-trade BHARs. The sample covers the period 1986-2010. 
 
 Purchases Sales 
 BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) BHAR(0,30) BHAR(0,90) BHAR(0,180) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Regression results 
Ln (mcap) -0.048*** -0.142*** -0.300*** -0.050*** -0.169*** -0.339*** 
 (-14.39) (-18.54) (-19.18) (-15.54) (-15.56) (-17.83) 
Book-to-market 0.011* 0.009 0.005 -0.018*** -0.039* -0.071** 
 (1.84) (0.74) (0.28) (-3.02) (-1.93) (-2.37) 
Past return -0.033*** 0.006 0.036* -0.017*** -0.017** 0.012 
 (-5.77) (0.50) (1.94) (-3.32) (-2.29) (1.25) 
Trade size 2.662*** 3.231*** 1.957 1.031*** 1.601*** 0.804 
 (4.87) (3.05) (1.53) (2.92) (3.08) (1.47) 
CEO dummy -0.012** -0.014 -0.028* 0.006 0.007 0.016 
 (-2.15) (-1.32) (-1.65) (1.52) (0.89) (1.25) 
CFO dummy 0.001 0.010 -0.009 0.005 0.011 0.011 
 (0.09) (0.66) (-0.25) (0.90) (1.17) (0.71) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-sq 26.3% 36.9% 43.8% 21.7% 33.0% 42.2% 
# of observations 100,627 100,627 100,627 195,670 195,670 195,670 
Panel B. Relative importance of determinants of BHARs 
 cov(BHAR, determinant) 
var(BHAR) 
Observable 
characteristics 
incl. year dummies 0.052 0.080 0.100 0.015 0.026 0.043 
Insider FE 0.154 0.156 0.142 0.118 0.124 0.130 
Firm FE 0.189 0.247 0.296 0.160 0.245 0.304 
Residual 0.605 0.518 0.461 0.708 0.606 0.523 
 % of R-sq attributable to the determinant 
Observable 
characteristics 
incl. year dummies 13.3% 16.5% 18.6% 5.0% 6.5% 9.0% 
Insider FE 39.0% 32.3% 26.4% 40.3% 31.4% 27.2% 
Firm FE 47.8% 51.2% 55.0% 54.7% 62.1% 63.8% 
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Highlights 
x Personal attributes are a key driver of insider trading performance 
x They explain up to a third of the variability in post-trade abnormal returns 
x They dominate firm characteristics by a sizeable margin 
x They matter more in firms with richer public and private information environments 
x They matter more when regulations are stricter 
